Since it transitioned to a market economy in the early 1990s, Mongolia has taken a series of measures to liberalise and privatise its economy. It joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1997 and over a 30-year period since the early 1990s, it has entered into 44 Bilateral Investment Agreements, of which 37 are currently in effect.¹ It is also party to five Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), of which two are in effect.² These agreements have facilitated trade and the entry of foreign investment into the country, much of which have been targeted at Mongolia’s vast natural resources. In December 2022, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in mining and quarrying reached an all-time high of 20.175 bn USD, averaging over 15 bn USD between December 2010 – December 2022.<sup3 According to the World Bank’s latest Economic Update for Mongolia, the over-reliance on the mining sector, external sector imbalances, increasing fiscal risks and high levels of debt pose serious challenges for the economy.⁴

In December 2022, Mongolia’s external debt reached 33.6 bn USD, which is a little under its all-time high of 33.9 USD bn recorded in March 2022, as compared with 4.2 bn USD in September 2000.⁵ This constitutes about 70 per cent of GDP — over 90 per cent of which is denominated in foreign exchange, raising serious questions about Mongolia’s external debt sustainability.⁶ Moreover, as a response to the pandemic, the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank provided support to Mongolia in the form of loans. These measures will further push Mongolia’s debt into unsustainable territory because of expected waves of austerity measures with damaging consequences for women’s rights.⁷ As women’s rights groups have repeatedly highlighted, debt has highly gendered impacts, particularly as the effect of debt is cuts to public spending, which in turn lead to reductions in the availability of essential public services. This interferes with women’s enjoyment of their rights in several ways – not only are women more reliant on public services and social security guarantees than men, but they are also the ones who are left to fill the gaps in the provision that occurs when services are reduced.⁸

Another impact of the liberalisation measures, particularly the investment agreements, have been the use of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms which enable foreign corporations to sue sovereign governments if they deem that their profits are in any way affected by governmental action. Since 2001, the Mongolian government has been at the receiving end of six ISDS cases raised by foreign investors of which five relate to investments in the mining sector.⁹ Of these five, there is no available data on one of the cases, two disputes remain pending and two cases have been decided – one in favour of the investor and one in favour of the government. In the case that was found in favour of the investor, the government was asked to pay 80 million USD, and in the two disputes that remain pending, investors have made claims of the Mongolian government to the tune of 1 bn USD and 145 million USD respectively.

The high expectations that the extractive industries would not just contribute to economic growth but also increase productive employment and reduce poverty have not been adequately met over the years. Foreign investment in mining has created only a limited number of jobs. In 2022, the sector employed just 56,003 people (of whom only 16 per cent were female) as opposed to the agricultural and livestock sector, which employed 291,678 people in the same year (of whom 43 per cent were women).¹⁰ Moreover, the sector has had deep impacts on women’s human rights and Development Justice as it relies on large-scale land and resource grabbing that detrimentally impact women’s lives and livelihoods that are rooted in Mongolia’s pastoral economy and traditional nomadic life, including their herding rights.¹¹

As a recent fact-finding mission conducted in October 2022 by FORUM-ASIA and Centre for Human Rights and Development (CHRD) found, pastoral communities in areas such Ulaaanbadrakh soum of Dornogovi province, who have called this land their home for decades, were slowly losing their rights over it.

“With the support of the government, mining companies were taking over not just the land of communities, but also their air, water, livelihoods as well as their health.”

The report found that the shrinking of pastureland not only adversely impacted the income and traditional livelihoods and ways of life of herding communities, there was also a deterioration in the health of the community, owing to the dust and chemicals generated from the mining operations. There was also a reduction in water sources which increased water insecurities. The report also found an increase in air and water pollution as a result of the mining operations, and an increased desertification, which in turn contributes to climate change. Additionally, the report found that communities are being threatened into silence, with targeted attacks on human rights defenders, including Women Human Rights Defenders becoming more commonplace.^{12, 13}

Over recent years, state policies in Mongolia have been largely supportive of large business groups and their interests. Currently, a new draft law on Public Private Partnerships (PPP) is in the process of development. In 2009, the State Policy on PPP was adopted to promote private sector participation in the provision of infrastructure. This was followed by the Law of Concession in 2010, which laid out the processes of implementation of PPPs through the grant of rights to the private sector to possess, use, build and improve state or locally owned properties. Following this, the Procedure for Competitive Concession Bid Selection and the Procedure for Evaluating Concession Bids in 2012 were initiated to regulate the allocation of various development projects in infrastructure and social sectors in Ulaanbaatar and the countryside. By 2013, the approved List of Concessions included 234 projects targeting various infrastructure and basic services such as road and transportation, communications, rail, education and health.¹

However, despite this regulatory landscape, there continue to be gaps, particularly in the granting of concessions through direct contracting and in the mechanisms to monitor and control PPPs.² Moreover, PPPs have not led to either improved access or quality of essential services. In fact, ground reports suggest that the quality of the health service, in which there has been management privatisation for more than 10 years, has worsened over this period. In other words, the involvement of private businesses in schools and hospitals has contributed to inequalities by dividing the population.

Given the enduring history of centuries of Mongolian pastoralism, land has traditionally been understood and protected as common property. In the early years of the transition to a free-market economy, for the first time in 1991, through a revision to the Constitution, individuals were allowed to own private land in urban settlements, even as pastoral land and other natural resources continued to remain state property.¹ This change was legislated upon in 1994 through the first Land Law, and since then, there have been a series of legislations that have elaborated on various types of land tenure, the rules for ownership and allocation of land, as well as instituting a right for all Mongolian citizens to a free piece of land. However, there continues to be a lack of transparency, legal inconsistencies, and manipulation of allocation of land. And on the question of women’s land rights, although women have formal equality in relation to inheritance, land use and ownership of property, often during land privatisation however, titles are placed in the name of the male household head, rather than through joint titling.² Moreover, it is difficult to gather the extent of gendered disparities in land ownership owing to the lack of gender disaggregated data.

In relation to land use, particularly since the transition to the market economy, there have been several changes to patterns of land use which impact women’s human rights and Development Justice. Not only has increased urbanisation put pressure on public services and provisions in cities such as Ulaanbaatar, but there has also been shifts in patterns of nomadic pastoralism with herding becoming more fixed around community settlements. This has been accompanied by an increase in the numbers of livestock with the animal population doubling in the country in less than 10 years, intensifying overgrazing.³

Another shift in land use has come from the mining sector.

“Although foreign ownership of land is not permitted, the state has leased land to both domestic and foreign companies, with the vast majority of leases involving the mining sector. In 2020, there were 2,641 active licences to explore or mine 57 types of minerals in Mongolia, covering four per cent of the total land area of Mongolia”⁴

The sector, as we have seen, impacts not just the lives, livelihoods and rights of herding communities, but it also has sustained environmental impacts.

Mongolia has seen an intensifying series of climate crises in the form of substantially higher temperatures which have contributed to the drying up of the country’s water resources. There has also been an increase in the number and intensity of extreme events, especially droughts, which disproportionately impact those reliant on agriculture and herding.¹ One of the reasons for the high susceptibility of the country to extreme climate events is its location at a high elevation with climate characterised by long cold winters and short summers.²

“The processes of development in the name of economic growth including increasing urbanisation and the rise of the mining sector have also contributed to the increased susceptibility of the country to adverse climate change. The sector has significantly contributed to erosion as well as a reduction of land for herders, with available grasslands being overstressed, leading to degradation and desertification”³

Governmental inaction on addressing the impacts of mining have contributed to the intensification of climate change. For example, there has been a lack of consultations with local herders in the processes of environmental impact assessment for special licence issuance, lack of rehabilitation during mining activities, and weak monitoring to ensure implementation of environmental protection laws. This inaction has contributed to negative impacts such as soil deterioration, pollution of potable water sources, drying of rivers and waters. This has also led to an increase in social unrest and disputes between local citizens and mining companies.

Unlike other countries of the region, military spending in Mongolia has seen a sharp reduction in the years following its transition to a multi-party democracy. Military spending has also been relatively modest averaging 0.8 per cent of GDP over the last decade.¹

Sandwiched as it is between two expansionist powers, the country is in a geo-strategic hotspot with major powers seeking to gain strategic advantage in the region. However, since the transition, in order to maintain its sovereignty and security rather than increase its military capabilities, the country has formulated a geopolitical strategy that is built primarily around developing friendly relations with its two neighbours, as well as privileged relations with democratic countries, its ‘third neighbours’.² This has meant a departure from its military alliance of several decades with the erstwhile Soviet Union and a commitment to neutrality which has included a declaration of its territory as a nuclear weapon-free zone and membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. Additionally, Mongolia’s small military has become a significant foreign policy instrument to advance its third neighbours’ policy, which it has pursued through the deployment of its military as a peace-keeping force.³

Mongolian women have had a key role to play in Mongolian peacekeeping with the Mongolian army steadily increasing the numbers of women deployed in peacekeeping. The commitment of the country to bolster the role of women in peacekeeping is also demonstrated by the Mongolian President pledging to the UN General Assembly in September 2021 an increase in the percentage of Mongolian women peacekeepers to 15 per cent in alignment with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.⁴

In its latest assessment of civic space in Mongolia, CIVICUS found that the space for civil society had ‘narrowed’. While this assessment was an upgrade from its previous assessment of an ‘obstructed’ civil society owing primarily to the adoption in April 2021 of a new law to protect human rights defenders, CIVICUS also raised concerns about press freedoms, as well as harassment, intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders through the use of security laws.¹ This narrowing of civic space was also echoed by the fact-finding report on the impacts of mining on herder communities in Mongolia conducted in October 2022 by FORUM-ASIA and CHRD which found that communities raising concerns or protesting mining operations were increasingly being threatened into silence, with targeted attacks on human rights defenders becoming more commonplace.²

In October 2022, the state of reprisals against human rights defenders in Mongolia was raised as a concern by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) in its Concluding Observations where it brought attention to reports of harassment, intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders, including the woman human rights defender and Oyu Tolgoi Watch Executive Director, Sukhgerel Dugersuren, who is being investigated under Mongolia’s security laws. CESCR found that there was a clear reprisal by the state against Sukhgerel Dugersuren who has worked closely with communities impacted by large scale development projects including mining, energy and infrastructure projects seeking state and corporate accountability.^3,4

Through the difficult transition years when many families were plunged into poverty as previously protected jobs disappeared and social services were drastically reduced, Mongolia saw a significant regression of women’s rights in the country through a deepening of patriarchal structures and social norms. This resulted in a widening of gendered inequalities in political, economic and social life.¹ Prior to the 1990s, during the socialist regime, women’s participation in politics was ensured through quota systems. In 1990, when the country began the process of transition to a multi-party democracy, women constituted 23 per cent of the total number of representatives in the national parliament, which was reduced to three per cent in 1992. The percentage of women in parliament stayed consistently low till it began improving from 2012 onwards.² This was because during the initial years of transition, the women’s seat quota was eliminated, and since then efforts to include women in parliament have shifted to candidacy quotas, though these efforts have been plagued by inconsistency and instability for women.

A candidacy quota of 30 per cent for women was first introduced in 2005 but was abruptly removed from election law prior to the elections in 2008 and was never tested. Another amendment to the election law in 2012 reintroduced the candidacy quota of 30 per cent, retained it in an amendment to election law in 2015, but it was abruptly and unconstitutionally reduced to 20 per cent prior to the elections in 2016.³ In 2020, during the last parliamentary elections, women constituted 17.11 per cent of elected representatives to the national parliament, a vast improvement from the low of three per cent in 1992, but below the regional aggregate of 21 per cent for East Asia and the Pacific.⁴

In terms of women’s employment too, Mongolia continues to face significant challenges with persistent and widening gender gaps between male and female labour force participation rates. The ratio of female to male labour force participation has dropped from 82.3 per cent in 2017 to 76.8 per cent in 2021. Further, the impacts of the pandemic on women’s labour force participation rates have continued to reverberate with the rate falling sharply from 63 per cent in 2019 to 58.7 per cent in 2021.⁵ Moreover, as APWLD partner, Dem Ololt found in their advocacy report, job security was particularly risky for women whose usual childcare services were suspended.⁶

While the pandemic exposed and exacerbated gender gaps in the performance of unpaid work – both care work and in family businesses – data collected by the National Statistics Agency in 2018 found these gender gaps to be significant.

“The data pointed to systemic issues in the gendered division of unpaid labour, with women continuing to disproportionately perform such work – accounting for 75.9 per cent – in both the household and in family-owned businesses.”

Women in Mongolia also continue to experience gendered inequalities in relation to asset ownership. A 2018 study by the National Statistics Office found that men own 1.8 times more housing than women.⁷ This difference was more acutely felt in rural areas, compared with urban areas, with men owning three times more housing than women.

In terms of Gender-Based Violence (GBV), in a study carried out by the National Statistics Office with United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in 2017 involving 7,319 women, it was found that one in every two Mongolian women has experienced violence perpetrated by an intimate partner at least once in their lives.⁸ Heartbreakingly, over one in 10 of all women reported having experienced sexual abuse before they were 15 years old, with the 29.5 per cent of perpetrators of violence being other family members. Another recent study focused on GBV at the workplace conducted by the National Human Rights Commission of Mongolia and the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 10 per cent of women said they had experienced sexual harassment of some form at their workplace.⁹

Since initiating its ‘Opening and Reform’ policy in the late 1970s, China has taken a series of measures to liberalise and privatise its economy over the years, including expanding exports enormously and absorbing significant amounts of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).¹ In 2001, China joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which fuelled an increase in Chinese exports and greater economic growth. From 2002 to 2007, net exports as a share of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in China increased from 2.6 per cent to 7.7 per cent.² Although vast international investment has enabled a wide range of jobs and consumer choices with real annual wages doubling from 2001 to 2006 across industries, there have also been other significant shifts in the economy. There has been a significant decrease in the percentage of workers employed in agriculture from 50 per cent in 2001 to 11.2 per cent in 2010.³ Moreover, economic growth has had detrimental impacts on natural resources and the environment. The last 40 years has also seen a worsening of inequalities pointing to systemic issues with the model of economic growth pursued by China.

Since the 1990s, China has also been party to 145 bilateral investment agreements, of which 110 are in force, with 35 agreements being either terminated or having never been in force.⁴ It is also party to 25 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) of which 23 are in force.⁵ One of these FTAs is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), understood to be the largest FTA in the world, signed with 14 other countries in 2020. Apart from FTAs and other investment agreements, a significant component of China’s trade and foreign policy is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that it launched in 2013 through which China has been investing in about 70 countries. In the first half of 2021, China reached a trade volume of 535 million RMB with BRI countries.⁶

However, China’s trade policy has drawn criticism and retaliation from the US, European Union (EU) and other countries who also seek to gain economic ascendancy through trade in the region. Moreover,

“There have been concerns about the Belt and Road Initiative in terms of its neglect of the rule of law and human rights in partner countries, as well as the negative impacts on the environment, labour rights in local communities and the lack of gender responsiveness.”

The number and size of Chinese companies are increasing vastly. In 2020, there were 22,000 new companies on average registered every day. In total, there were 140 million market entities in China in 2020.¹ China also has had the largest number of Fortune 500 companies in the world since 2020, and in 2022, Fortune 500 firms continued to outnumber those from the US, 136 to 124. Moreover, China also had more firms on the list than Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) combined.² Despite this incredible growth in corporations, not all companies practise social responsibility. While the number of companies that publish their corporate social responsibility reports has increased from 739 in 2009 to 1,806 in 2020, this number is miniscule compared to the number of companies getting registered daily.³

China’s fast-paced economy has benefited greatly from low-paid labourers, the majority of whom are migrant workers. In 2021, there were 292 million migrant workers comprising more than one-third of the entire working population.⁴ Apart from being underpaid, these workers do not have access to the full benefits of residency including medical care, housing, pension or children’s education due to the ‘hukou’ (residence registration) system. As China does not allow for independent labour unions, they often have little leverage to claim their rights when violated.

“Women account for about 35.9 per cent of migrant workers, and they too suffer from discriminatory treatment and poor social services, as well as abduction and trafficking, sexual exploitation and violence, unmet-reproductive health needs, gender discrimination and more.⁴“

Poor working conditions like long working hours are not only common for blue-collar workers, but also for white-collar workers in internet giants.

In terms of women’s employment, while China has one of the highest female labour force participation rates, at 61 per cent in 2021, there has been a consistent decline in labour force participation of women over the last 30 years.⁵ There are currently no gender quotas for women on boards or in senior management positions. China’s corporate governance code (Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China) does not mention gender as a desirable quality or background for board candidates.

Even so, there have been some positive changes in relation to corporate social responsibility in recent years. As part of the efforts to reach its climate goals, China has introduced and updated Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) guidelines that require companies to voluntarily disclose information around environmental protection, efforts on poverty alleviation, biodiversity and so on.

In China, the state claims ownership of all land and natural resources. Farmers are granted the right of usage of land by government sponsored ‘collective units’.

However, in the last two decades, there has been an increase in forced demolitions and evictions in the name of economic development and city planning.

Although there is a lack of systematic data on the numbers of people displaced by forced evictions, it is estimated that from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s, 40 million people were affected by land requisitions, and since 2005, surveys have shown a steady increase in the number of forced evictions in China, with local governments appropriating the land of approximately 4 million people annually.¹ One of the consequences of this has been increased landlessness, with women making up a significant proportion of the landless caused by development projects.

Apart from forced demolitions and evictions, rural women in China, who make up 70 per cent of rural labour,² are especially deprived of land rights due to patriarchal codes of conduct in rural areas. A survey conducted by the All-China Women’s Federation in 2018 found that fewer than 20 per cent of rural women are included on land certificates.³ Rural women and their children account for the majority of the landless population. According to a survey conducted on the status of Chinese women in 2011, 21 per cent of rural women have no land, an increase of 11.8 percentage points from the 2000 survey. Among them, 27.7 per cent of women lost land due to marriage changes (marriage, remarriage, divorce, and widowhood), while only 3.7 per cent of men lost land due to marriage changes.⁴

Rural women’s land rights face multiple threats from discriminatory systems, laws, policies, culture, and gendered norms. In the context of rural land, the ‘three rights separation’ legal policy,⁵ infringes the land rights of married women in the transfer of rural contracted land. It is mainly reflected in the damage to the transfer income of contracted land, the decision-making power of the mortgage of land management rights and the inheritance right of the transfer of income of contracted land.⁶

The shift of global manufacturing to China has made the country more vulnerable to climate change and to climate-change induced disasters. China is currently the world’s largest emitter of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs), being responsible for one-thirds of the global emission of GHGs. However, it is not the main source of historical cumulative emissions and is surpassed by the United States, Russia and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) block of countries in global Carbon Dioxide emissions per capita, and by the OECD block of countries in total GHG emissions as well.¹ Recent floods and droughts in several parts of the country that have devastated large parts of the country, affecting its poorest the worst, attest to the risks of extreme weather events that accompany climate change.² A recent study by climate risk analysts has found that the country is home to 16 of the 20 global regions most vulnerable to climate change and Gross Domestic Climate Risk, calculated as the physical climate risk to the built environment.³

While climate change has enormous economic costs, the risk to lives and livelihoods from climate change are devastating. According to a recent study, 1.24 million deaths in 2017 were attributable to air pollution.⁴ Women are also more likely to face the worst impacts of climate change due to their disadvantaged socio-economic status. Moreover, women’s livelihoods are more likely to be detrimentally affected by climate change and disasters as they rely more on agricultural livelihoods and earn less than men.

In recent years, China is trying to make a bigger commitment to environmental protection. In 2021, it spent USD 266 billion on the deployment of low-carbon technologies, accounting for more than a third of the global total.⁵ This was preceded by the commitment to strengthen its climate targets, including the long-term targets of reaching a Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions peak before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.⁶ However, the Climate Action Tracker’s analysis rates China’s overall action on climate change as ‘highly insufficient’,⁷ pointing to the mammoth nature of the task ahead. The challenges have been heightened by China’s post-COVID-19 recovery activities which remain carbon-intensive and require high energy demand from a system run primarily on fossil fuels.

“At the institutional level, there is little recognition of the impact of climate change on women and gender equality.”

In the Chinese Women’s Development Program (2011-2020 and 2021-2030) issued by China’s State Council,⁸ ‘Women and Environment’ is one of the seven major development areas to focus on. Improving water safety and number of latrines, encouraging women to participate in pollution reduction, improving the capacity of women to prevent and handle disasters and fulfilling special needs of women in disaster reduction are mentioned. However, there is no mention of climate change and no gender-disaggregated data in this area were collected or published in the official monitoring reports of the program.

China is a highly militarised country, and its defence spending has been growing significantly for 28 consecutive years.¹ In 2022, China continued to be the world’s second largest military spender (behind the US), allocating an estimated $292 billion on defence spending, which constituted 5.7 per cent of its total budget.² The total spending increase on defence was 4.2 per cent more than in 2021 and an astonishing 63 per cent more than in 2013.³ China also has the world’s largest army with 2 million active personnel in 2022. There are no official figures for the number of women in the Chinese military, but estimates suggest that women constitute about 4.5 per cent of personnel in the army, with most of them being employed in medical or art units.⁴

In recent years, China has been party to increasing military tensions with its neighbours. These include conflicts with India along the 2,100-mile disputed border in the Himalayas. A major clash in the Galwan valley in June 2020 resulted in over 20 deaths on the Indian side and four on the Chinese side, the worst confrontation between the two countries since 1975.⁵ The border continues to be on the boil, with the most recent flare up in December 2022.

China has also had long standing disputes in the South China Sea since the 1960s with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei. There have also been increasing tensions in the East China Sea with Japan with both sides accusing each other of infringing on each other’s maritime territory.⁶ China has given itself legal authority to address any infringements of its sovereignty at sea through a new Coast Guard Law in January 2021, which enables it to use weapons against foreign vessels. Another source of persistent geo-political tensions has been its dispute with Taiwan, which has been governed differently from mainland China since 1949. Mainland China has deployed missiles along the Taiwan Strait and continues to periodically conduct drills near the island. Army aircrafts from the mainland also frequently appear in Taiwan’s air defence zone, most recently in March 2023.⁷

Increasingly, China is showing off its military strength internationally. Even on diplomatic occasions, more and more ‘wolf warrior’ language is used instead of diplomatic rhetoric, including the response to foreign media and public opinion during the pandemic. Official attitudes, civil nationalism/statism and militarism reinforce and facilitate each other.

“Public opinion against neighbouring countries and ‘hostile forces’ has been hardening, and violence and attacks on pacifism and feminism are rampant. Feminists are often targeted as agents of hostile foreign forces with state power being used to shut down feminist social media.”

Since his ascendancy to the Chinese Presidency, President Xi Jinping has highlighted the importance of ‘maintaining stability’ through centralised ‘political and legal work’ by firmly grasping the ‘knife handle’ which has been interpreted to mean the use of ‘strict and severe means’ to ‘solve problems’.¹ In budgetary terms, this has meant an exponential increase in ‘public security’ spending over the years which is used to maintain public order. In a decade, this amount had more than doubled to reach a budget of 210 bn USD in 2020, seven per cent higher than the defend cost for the same year.²

There are many areas in which the Chinese government seeks to maintain social stability by using strict and severe means. In the arena of information control, censorship is pervasive and increasingly strict. Apart from the ‘great firewall’ to block out selected foreign websites, there has been an increase in cases of citizens being prosecuted for using Virtual Private Networks (VPN) to visit foreign websites or speech that is seen as disrespectful to the state. During the pandemic, the state levelled up its censorship strategy by investing enormous resources to shape online opinion by removing trending topics, blocking accounts and deleting ‘unwanted opinion’.³ Apart from censoring the news and social media, the state cracked down heavily on whistle-blowers and citizen journalists. Citizen journalist Zhang Zhan was sentenced to four years in prison for reporting on Wuhan’s lockdown through social media.⁴ Similarly, a woman user of the Chinese social media platform, Weibo, was sentenced to 6 months in prison for one widely shared post of stories about the Wuhan lockdown.⁵

“China already has the world’s largest surveillance network and from 2010 to 2019, government procurement orders for equipment related to surveillance increased by nearly 1,900 per cent.^{6, 7}“

During the pandemic, China expanded its surveillance and monitoring of citizens even further in the name of public health and safety, through tracking intelligence, facial recognition, big data and other technologies. These surveillance technologies were also used to track and intimidate protestors against China’s strict COVID-19 rules.⁸

China is also stepping up security measures and its control in regions Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Hong Kong. In Xinjiang, the Chinese government has been accused of imprisoning more than one million ethnic minority people since 2017 and subjecting those not detained to intense surveillance, religious restrictions, forced labour, sexual assault and forced sterilisations.⁹ In Hong Kong, during the mass protests in 2019, over 10,000 mostly young people were detained and over 6,000 arrested. The protests have seen unprecedented participation by young women which has shattered existing gender norms and empowered a new generation of women activists. However, the protests have also been mired by Sexual and Gender-based Violence (SGBV) against young women by the police.¹⁰

In June 2020, China passed a national security law specific to Hong Kong to deal with ‘secession, foreign interference, terrorism and subversion against the central government’. Based on this law, over 100 activists, journalists, entrepreneurs and others had been arrested until March 2021, many of whom were women. Moreover, in the face of this increased state repression, since 2021, at least 50 Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) — including unions, churches, media groups and political parties — have disbanded.¹¹

China has a long history of recognising formal equality, with the principle of equality between men and women written into China’s first Constitution in 1954. In 1990, China established the National Working Committee on Children and Women to organise and coordinate government organisations on gender equality and women’s development. In 1992, China issued its first specialised law on the protection of women, the Law on the Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, with amendments in 2005 adding regulations on domestic violence and sexual harassment. Since 1995, the State Council has been issuing policies called the Programs for the Development of Chinese Women (1995-2000, 2001-2010, 2011-2020, 2021-2030) to set targets and provide guidelines for central and local governments to advance women’s human rights.

Despite these mechanisms and policies, China continues to be largely dominated by patriarchal structures and norms in political, economic and social life. Over the years, progress on closing gender gaps has not been significant, and in some areas, it has been worsening. In terms of political representation,

“no woman has ever been a member of China’s Politburo Standing Committee, the small group that has run the country for the last 70 years.”

China took a further step back in 2022 eliminating women even from the next level of power, with the latest politburo of 24-members being constituted solely by men.¹ In the National Peoples’ Congress, currently there are 790 women, constituting 26.54 per cent of the total number of representatives. While this is higher than the regional average of 21.2 percent, this is much lower than the average in other regions such as the Americas or Europe at 34.9 and 31.1 per cent respectively.²

The rate of women’s participation in the labour force has shown a consistent decline from the 1990s, from a high of 73 per cent in 1990 to a low of 59 per cent in 2020 at the height of the pandemic.³ While the labour force participation rates have marginally improved to pre-pandemic levels to 61 per cent in 2021, the relatively low labour force participation rates of women point to systemic issues. According to the results of the fourth survey on the social status of women in China, women spend twice as much time than men on household chores,⁴ drawing attention to deep-seated patriarchal norms on the roles of women. Leaders of the party-state also promote conservative gender norms, as does the media which often emphasises women’s subordinate roles. There are even ‘female virtue’ classes to train women to internalise patriarchal ethics and norms in the name of traditional culture or Confucianism.

Gender equality and women’s human rights are largely not prioritised by the government in practice. Women and girls are still directly or indirectly discriminated against by law, policies and political, economic and social culture. Cases of violation of women’s rights, particularly Gender-Based Violence (GBV) are often inadequately handled by the judiciary and administration, with women crying out for changes to the status quo.

Vanuatu became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2012 and, as per the Vanuatu National Statistics Office’s September 2022 report, is part of the Melanesian Free Trade Agreement (MFTA) with four other nations.¹ This agreement aims for economic integration within the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). The 2018 WTO Trade Policy Review revealed that Vanuatu offers at least Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment to all trading counterparts.² It participates in multiple regional pacts, including the MSG Trade Agreement, Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), and the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations Plus (PACER Plus). These agreements facilitate preferential trade with South Pacific countries. Vanuatu enjoys non-reciprocal trade benefits, such as the Generalised System of Preferences from certain WTO members. Moreover, under the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA) and the EU’s Everything but Arms initiative, Vanuatu’s exports receive duty-free and quota-free access to markets in Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union.

In Vanuatu, a significant transparency deficit exists, particularly in trade-related decision-making processes. Women, despite being vital stakeholders, rarely participate in the framing and deliberation of trade agreements, an exclusion that can lead to unanticipated gendered impacts. The PACER Plus is a case in point. This agreement, aimed at enhancing economic integration with Australia and New Zealand, carries with it potential repercussions for Vanuatu’s labour dynamics. Given the country’s economic challenges, many of its citizens seek opportunities abroad, leveraging preferential labour mobility agreements, especially those provided by countries like Australia and New Zealand. With PACER Plus in play, the patterns of such international migrations from Vanuatu might undergo significant shifts. Furthermore, the ramifications of PACER Plus on labour movements in Vanuatu, particularly in light of the prevailing lack of transparency and gender inclusivity in trade negotiations, are of concern.³

Vanuatu’s public sector debt stood at 51.5 per cent of its GDP at the end of 2020, maintaining stability since 2018.⁴ While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) classifies Vanuatu at a moderate risk of debt distress, the nation has minimal buffer to handle economic shocks. The tourism-dependent economy of Vanuatu suffered a blow from the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to an economic downturn. Starting in 2020, there was a corresponding increase in public expenditure to mitigate the impacts of both the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change. By 2022, its debt-to-GDP ratio – a widely-used metric – reached 46.6 per cent and is projected to climb to 75.1 per cent⁵ Rising debt levels, persistent trade deficits, and the escalating climate crisis strain the government’s capacity to fund essential public services. This might drive the adoption of austerity measures, potentially hampering the region’s economic rebound. Concurrently, the region has seen a surge in prices, especially for essential goods, due to the pandemic-induced supply chain disruptions and the Russia-Ukraine conflict.⁶ Notably, Vanuatu ranks among the nations most indebted to China, with nearly half its external debt owed to Beijing, representing just over 13 per cent of its GDP. This poses concerns over increased vulnerability to Beijing’s diplomatic influence and the challenges of unsustainable debt loads.⁷

As witnessed globally, the government’s diminished capacity to support public services places a disproportionate burden on women. Reduced state care services led to an uptick in women’s unpaid care work, restricting their time for paid roles, political activities, and leisure while impacting their health. Additionally, as household managers, women grapple with the challenges of escalating costs against dwindling incomes.

Although the levels of the consumption-based poverty¹ in Vanuatu can be considered low, with a national average rate of 15.9 per cent,² Vanuatu has historically faced challenges related to poverty. Despite its rich cultural heritage and abundant natural resources, factors like geographic isolation, vulnerability to natural disasters, and limited infrastructure have constrained its socio-economic development. A significant portion of the population relies on subsistence farming, which is often threatened by extreme weather events, including cyclones and volcanic eruptions. Tourism, a major source of revenue for the country, can be volatile due to external factors, making it an unreliable source of income for many. 

In areas around North Malekula, Maewo, Pentecost, and Tanna, poverty rates appear to be substantially higher than the national average, while the lowest rates are observed in prime agricultural regions such as Santo, and parts of Ambae and Ambrym.³ Despite efforts from both the national government and international partners to mitigate poverty, develop infrastructure, and diversify the economy, a significant portion of Vanuatu’s population continues to struggle with fundamental necessities. Many face challenges accessing quality education, health services, and consistent employment. The poverty headcount ratio stood at 38.7 per cent in 2022, using a threshold of USD 3.20.⁴

The 2010 Household Income and Expenditure Survey highlighted an average household weekly expenditure of 17,576 Vatu⁵ (VT).⁶ The lowest expenditure quintile averaged 7,259 VT, in contrast to the highest quintile’s 33,577 VT.⁷ Recognising the financial challenges faced by many households, the government increased the minimum wage from 170 VT (approximately USD 1.70) in 2018 to 200 VT (approximately USD 2). By 2023, this had risen to 220 VT⁸ and a recent announcement in June 2023 confirmed a further hike to 300 VT.⁹ Nonetheless, even this augmented figure falls short of covering household expenditures, particularly impacting low-income earners.

In Vanuatu, freehold land is non-existent. All urban territories are public, and all rural areas are governed by custom land practices, with ownership vested in local chiefs and family leaders.¹ The 2020 Census indicated that 73 per cent of private households operate under customary land tenure agreements. Despite the absence of overtly discriminatory laws concerning land access or ownership, Kastam or indigenous traditions strongly favour patrilineal inheritance, causing women to seldom possess registered leases or sub-leases. This gender-biased custom means that a minority of households are led by women, while men predominantly have primary land rights. These traditional norms also discourage or inhibit women from being active participants in land management and tenure decisions. The National Sustainable Development Plan Baseline Survey disclosed that male-headed households predominantly have access to customary land compared to female-led ones.² Although the Vanuatu Land Registry does not maintain sex-disaggregated land lease data, in 2015, the Land Management and Planning Committee Chair noted that women constituted 30 per cent of Ni-Vanuatu lease applicants. While the exact data from the 2020 Census regarding the percentage of women-headed households is not available, the 2016 Mini Census recorded that women helmed 17.5 per cent of households in Vanuatu.³

Vanuatu lacks formal military forces. Instead, its security apparatus consists of the Vanuatu Police Force, which encompasses the Vanuatu Mobile Force (VMF) and the Police Maritime Wing. The paramilitary VMF is vested with external security duties. Despite its vast cultural diversity, Vanuatu has maintained a consistent record of peace and democratic governance. The nation has avoided civil or major tribal conflicts, with only sporadic domestic land disputes occurring. Consequently, there has been no substantial military expenditure.

Vanuatu’s Constitution, established in 1980, guarantees the fundamental rights and freedoms of every individual, regardless of place of origin, religious or traditional belief, political opinions, language or sex.¹ However, it also respects the preservation of customary law practices, which can, at times, contradict gender equality, especially in matters of customary land, as aforementioned.² Kastom, or indigenous practices, though varied, often express patriarchal values ingrained through historical religious and colonial influences.³ To illustrate, despite the legal age for marriage being set at 21 for both genders, with parental consent, girls can marry at 16 and boys at 18. Kastom in some areas advises that girls are fit for marriage and intimacy post-menstruation, leading to early marriages. According to statistics collected by the international initiative Girls Not Brides between 2012 and 2018, 21 per cent of women were married by age 18 and three percent were married under the age of 15.⁴

Another customary practice reinforcing gender inequality is the ’bride price,’ where the groom or his family pays the bride’s family for her hand in marriage. A 2011 study revealed that 53 per cent of Vanuatu women felt they became a man’s property if a bride price was paid. This not only perpetuates the view of women as property, but can indirectly sanction marital violence and discourage women from leaving abusive relationships.⁵

Gender inequality in Vanuatu is further highlighted by women’s underrepresentation in leadership roles, disparities in education, employment opportunities, and health outcomes.

Traditional beliefs and customs uphold male dominance and customary family roles, which act as barriers to women’s full participation in political life, even in the absence of legal limitations. There is only one female representative in Vanuatu’s 52-member parliament.¹ Since independence in 1980, Vanuatu has had only five female members of parliament.² Despite an increase in female candidates from eight in 2016 to 18 in the 2020 elections, gender representation remains starkly imbalanced. Reasons cited by senior female political figures include the lack of financial resources for women to compete effectively. Local women’s rights groups have advocated for ‘affirmative action measures’ to bolster female representation. Yet no Temporary Special Measures are currently in effect.³

Efforts to address this disparity were evident when, in 2011, the Vanuatu Department of Women’s Affairs proposed reserving seats for women in Municipal Councils. This culminated in the Municipalities Amendment Act of 2013, introducing a quota for women in local elections. As a result, the 2018-2021 elections saw 11 female municipal councilors (25.6 per cent) and seven provincial female councilors (7.1 per cent) elected. No female mayors were chosen, but some attained deputy mayor positions. Nevertheless, the 2020 general elections witnessed over 15 female candidates, but none secured a victory.⁴

The public sector has seen a gradual rise in women in leadership. In 2019, of seven Director Generals, two were women, and eight Directors of 43 government departments were women. The progression is evident but remains limited in scope.⁵

In the 2020 Census,¹ women represented 48.7 per cent of those over the age of three currently attending schools in Vanuatu. Primary school Net Enrolment Rates (NER) showed slight gender parity at 95.8 per cent for boys and 94.9 per cent for girls. However, secondary school enrolment favours girls at 49.9 per cent compared to boys at 42.8 per cent. Alarmingly, there has been a significant dropout rate for girls at the secondary level, with 50 per cent leaving school between Grades 7 and 11. The lack of protection for pregnant students exacerbates this as no legislation facilitates their re-enrolment post-childbirth. The 2016 Global School-based Student Health Survey highlighted another concern: 50 per cent of girls aged 13-17 had skipped classes or school in the past month.

Education in Vanuatu presents challenges beyond gender disparities. While the National Sector Development Plan² emphasises the right to education, primary and secondary schooling isn’t compulsory or free. Indirect expenses, like transportation, add to the burden. Often, in such settings, boys are prioritised for education over girls due to societal norms and economic constraints.³

Furthermore, the educational environment in Vanuatu is not always safe. Incidents of school violence, including corporal punishment by teachers, are not uncommon. Even more concerning are reported cases of sexual violence involving both male educators and students. Research has shown a glaring deficiency in addressing these serious issues within the system, with schools lacking proper protocols to address and handle cases of sexual violence. This further perpetuates the vulnerabilities of female students.⁴

In the 2020 census,the Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) for women was 42.1 per cent, compared to 51.5 per cent for men aged 15 and above.¹ This is a significant dip from the 2009 census, which recorded a LFPR of 80.4 per cent for men and 61.4 per cent for women, with reasons given being that the 2020 census took place during the COVID-19 pandemic, when many people were driven out of the labour force.² Urban women participated more at 47.2 per cent, versus 40.4 per cent in rural areas. The 2019-2020 National Sustainable Development Plan (NSDP) Baseline Survey reported an unemployment rate of 9.4 per cent for women and 6.7 per cent for men, culminating in an overall 7.9 per cent.³ Youth unemployment stood at 20.1 percent for young women and 16.1 per cent for young men aged 15-24.

Participation in informal employment is similar for women and men with 68.7% of women and 65.5 per cent of men involved in informal employment as per the 2020 census. Of the female labour force, 13.4 per cent worked for the government and 21 per cent in the private sector in 2020, versus 12.9 per cent and 28.3 per cent for men respectively. A slightly higher percentage of men (4.6 per cent) compared to women (3.5 per cent) were employers.⁴

A significant gender disparity is evident in unpaid work. While 54.4 per cent of men were unpaid family workers, a notable 67.9 per cent of women were unpaid household workers. Moreover, 45.5 per cent of women’s primary activity was household care, while 50.2 per cent of men focused on paid or volunteer work. In terms of industry, both genders predominantly engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Notably, women outnumbered men in clerical, professional, and service roles. The COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted Vanuatu’s economy, particularly sectors like tourism where woVanuatu, an International Labour Organization (ILO) member since 2003, has ratified key ILO conventions, including the C100 Equal Remuneration Convention 1951 and C111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 1958. However, it has not ratified the ILO C183 Maternity Protection or C190 Violence and Harassment Conventions. Currently, there are specific laws against sexual harassment at the workplace in Vanuatu. A 2022 survey of 62 girls and women in Port Vila and surrounding areas found that 66 per cent had experienced sexual harassment at their workplace; 79 per cent of such cases were not reported due to ‘the normalization of sexual harassment’ or ‘unclear strategies on how to report’. The survey found many workplaces did not have sexual harassment policies.men are more present.⁵

In 2023, life expectancy in Vanuatu was 73 for women and 68 for men.¹ Despite this, the country is grappling with both communicable diseases like malaria and tuberculosis, and noncommunicable diseases. In 2019, mortality from diseases like cancer and diabetes was 33.5 per cent for women and 45.1 per cent for men.²

Cultural and societal barriers pose significant challenges for women’s health. These include low literacy rates among women, risks of Gender-Based Violence (GBV) and stigma around contraception, especially for younger or unmarried women. Community gossip and discrimination further restrict access to care. Menstrual health care access is especially limited, with rural women lacking sanitary products and urban girls struggling financially to obtain them. This often results in girls missing school during menstruation.³

LGBTQI+ individuals face societal discrimination, inhibiting their access to health care. Although the government offers reproductive health services for sexual violence survivors, broader challenges persist. The adolescent birth rate was 81 per 1,000 women aged 15-19 in 2023, higher than 70 per 1,000 per women recorded in 2020. In 2023, the maternal mortality rate was 94 per 100,000 live births,which is higher than the previous count of 72 per 100,000 live births in 2017.⁴ These fluctuations underscore the ongoing challenges women face in accessing comprehensive and safe health care in Vanuatu.

Violence against women is a significant concern in Vanuatu. The 2011 Vanuatu National Survey (VNS) reported that 60 per cent of women aged 15-49 who had been in a relationship experienced physical or sexual violence from a partner.¹ Furthermore, 30 per cent of women in the 2011 VNS stated they were sexually abused before turning 15. The Department of Correctional Services noted in 2021 that sexual crimes were the primary offences over the past decade, accounting for nearly half of all offences.² Data from 2021 revealed that domestic violence cases surged following the travel restriction during -COVID-19, with the Vanuatu Women’s Centre reporting a doubling of cases compared to 2020.³

The legal framework in place includes the Family Protection Act of 2008 (FPA) which criminalises domestic violence, though it notably lacks protections for unmarried women and domestic workers. While Vanuatu’s Penal Code recognises rape as a punishable crime with a potential life imprisonment sentence, it fails to explicitly criminalise marital rape.⁴ Furthermore, the FPA enables victims to obtain Family Protection Orders, which are critical in offering immediate respite to victims from their abusers. However, as of 2016, 74 per cent of interviewed women from rural areas had not heard of these protective orders.⁵ There are also ‘no drop’ policies, which instruct the police not to drop reported domestic violence cases, even if the complaint is subsequently withdrawn.

Despite these legal provisions, the effectiveness of the legal framework remains questionable. The police often hesitate to intervene in domestic disputes and the vast majority of cases, including rape, remain unreported. This hesitancy is exacerbated by traditional patriarchal norms and the considerable influence of chiefs in village-level dispute resolution. A 2016 study revealed that chiefs sometimes settle cases of rape and sexual assault rather than the formal justice system, leading to outcomes that are not in the best interests of survivors.⁶

Such prevailing attitudes are evident in the VNS findings, which highlight that 60 per cent of respondents believed there are scenarios where a man hitting his wife can be justified. The survey also pointed out the prevalence of controlling behaviours, such as a partner demanding to know the woman’s whereabouts or seeking his permission before she can access health care.

Challenges in accessing justice remain significant. According to the 2016 UN Women study, 98 per cent of women and children experiencing violence don’t access the formal justice system, with barriers including court fees, transportation, and medical expenses.⁷ The Family Protection Act, mainly an ’urban service,’has provisions like applying for protection orders by telephone to aid rural women. Still, in practice, these mechanisms are infrequently used.

Only 54 per cent of health facilities in the nation offer services tailored to victims of sexual and GBV. The facilities that do provide these services often lack crucial resources such as emergency contraceptives, vaccines, post-exposure HIV medications, or forensic medical services. Earlier research has underscored that a limited number of support programs employ trained professionals for counselling and therapy. In many cases, staff members rely on their instinct or ‘common sense’ to aid vulnerable women. However, this intuitive approach raises concerns as it can be heavily tinted by traditional perspectives on women’s roles, further impeding access to unbiased support.⁸

In this regard, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) like Vanuatu Women’s Centre, which is present in Port Vila and several provinces, play an important role in educating the public on issues relating to violence against women and helping women access the formal justice system. However, they lack sufficient funding to implement their programmes fully.

The Constitution provides for rights to freedom of expression and association, and the government generally upholds both these rights. With regard to the freedom of expression, there have been occasional cases of elected officials threatening journalists for critical reports.

However, libel and slander are criminal offences. There are no significant barriers on the formation and operation of NGOs. Workers can join unions, bargain collectively, and strike, although the right to strike may be impaired by notification rules and the government’s powers to bar such actions when it comes to essential services.¹ It’s worth noting that these freedoms, while universally applicable, can have gendered impacts. For instance, women journalists or activists may face distinct challenges or threats based on their gender when exercising their freedom of expression or association, potentially magnifying the vulnerabilities they encounter in professional or civic spaces.

Vanuatu, despite being a carbon negative nation, bears the unfortunate distinction of having the highest disaster risk rating globally as per the World Risk Index 2021.¹ The significant risk factors are manifold: frequent exposure to natural calamities such as cyclones, earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, and coastal flooding. Adding to the peril, about 64 per cent of its populace resides within 1km of the coast, and over half live in close proximity to one of its 14 volcanoes.

In 2020, following Tropical Cyclone Harold, a gender-focused analysis by CARE observed that women experienced a disproportionate burden in relation to caregiving roles.² In Vanuatu, women predominantly shoulder caregiving roles, be it for children, the elderly, or the disabled. Additionally, the onus of ensuring the household’s food security falls largely on them. Their responsibilities intensify during crises, while simultaneously vital health services, especially maternal and reproductive care are not adequately prioritised.This is not merely due to the immediate aftermath of such events but also rooted in societal structures.

Beyond the immediate threat of disasters, the creeping menace of climate change looms large for Vanuatu. The nation’s vulnerability to rising sea levels is particularly noteworthy. Climate change disrupts the balance of natural resources in various ways: altering freshwater supplies, shifting agricultural patterns, promoting saltwater intrusion, affecting plant growth and eroding natural protective barriers, to name a few.³

The Vanuatu Climate Change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy 2016-2030 addresses this precarious situation, especially from the perspective of vulnerable groups. The policy emphasises the importance of engaging these groups, particularly women and persons with disabilities, in formulating and executing adaptive strategies. Efforts to decentralise and localise responses are evident with the establishment of Community Disaster and Climate Change Committees (CDCCCs). Although the target of ensuring a third of these committee leaders are women hasn’t yet been met.

March 2023 was particularly tumultuous, with two severe cyclones and a significant earthquake affecting a vast majority of the populace. However, it also marked a diplomatic victory for Vanuatu. The country successfully petitioned the UN General Assembly to seek an authoritative opinion from the International Court of Justice on states’ climate change responsibilities.⁴ The government, in its third National Communication to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), highlighted the gender-skewed impact of climate change. Due to existing gender disparities, women and girls confront the repercussions more acutely. The reasons range from higher poverty rates among women, their dominant role in the subsistence economy, to the uptick in GBV post natural calamities. As climate patterns shift, these inequalities stand to be further exacerbated.

Key features of the legal and policy framework on climate change

Laws:

• Environmental Management and Conservation Act No. 12 (amended in 2011): defines and addresses climate related challenges and requires the inclusion of climate change issues in all decision and policy making. It also enables the government to take measures to meet commitments under the UNFCCC.
• Forestry Rights Registration and Timber Harvest Guarantee No. 28 (2000): regulates the registration, transfer and granting of forestry rights.

Key policies:

• Nationally Determined Contributions: provides for adaptation and mitigation strategies to increase climate resilience.
• National Adaptation Plan: to inter alia, provide a framework for mainstreaming climate change and disaster risk reduction into sustainable development processes and build resilience.
• Climate change and Disaster Risk Reduction Policy: to build resilience to and strengthen capacity to address climate change and disaster risk reduction. It advocates for the meaningful involvement of under-represented groups, including women and persons with disabilities, in planning and implementing climate disaster programmes.
• Policies and strategies on various aspects including energy, tourism, forest, water, ocean, agriculture, livestock, nutrition/food supply, waste management and biodiversity.

The Fijian economy is predominantly made up of services (70 per cent), followed by industry (15 per cent) and primary sectors including agriculture, forestry and fisheries (14 per cent). Its 2015 Trade and Policy Framework guides its domestic and international trade in key priority areas including sugar, agriculture, forestry and fisheries. This policy privileges the private sectors for driving economic growth and development.

Fiji is signatory to a number of bilateral¹ and multilateral trade agreements, including Melanesian Spearhead Group Trade Agreement (MSGTA), Pacific Islands Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (SPARTECA). It also benefits from Preferential Trade Agreements (PTA) including Generalised System of Preferences, SPARTECA and PTA with China. These agreements are often negotiated in secret and are ridden with legal jargon, which makes them inaccessible to governments, Parliament and ordinary people whose lives are most likely to be affected. The economic model fostered through these agreements thrive on exploiting women’s systematic discrimination and unpaid labour, sustaining growth through subsistence wages and hidden contributions to the care economy.²

Fiji is not a signatory to the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus trade and development agreement entered into by 10 Forum Island Countries (FIC)— including Australia, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Nauru and New Zealand. Under this agreement, both Australia and New Zealand have committed to assist FICs achieve economic growth and sustainable development, while at the same time availing of increased access into FIC markets. This agreement was not signed by Fiji as it did not meet its development needs.³ However, the PACER Plus agreement is triggered when Fiji attempts to avail of the Sugar Protocol, which provides preferential access for Fiji to markets in the European Union (EU) under the Economic Partnership Agreement. The PACER Plus agreement is expected to have significant gender implications in FICs given the importance of services, tourism and agriculture and fisheries, as well as the large share of small and medium sized enterprises in their economies. Concerns have been raised on the loss of tariff revenue and the resulting possible decline of public services, with negative repercussions for the reduction and the redistribution of women’s unpaid care work,⁴ diminished policy space,  environmental hazards, threats to the development of local industries.⁵ The PACER Plus agreement increases competition in sectors where women have a high labour participation rate thereby threatening their livelihoods and job security.⁶

The issue of corporate capture must be contextualised within the complex struggles and conflict between traditional land ownership systems and economic development for tourism and the extractive industry, including mining, and more recently, the bottling and sale of water. Efforts to reform traditional land ownership systems have resulted in political and ethno-nationalist tensions. About half of Fiji’s forests have already been lost due to clearance for agriculture, unsustainable logging, and fire, thus endangering species, the ecosystem, as well as local people’s livelihoods and cultural links with their land. Elite economic entities influence decision-makers to permit activities that have harmful impacts on the environment and future livelihoods. Overall, the Government’s short-sighted attempt at utilising land for economic growth has led to profit-gaining at the expense of the environment.

The commercialisation of Fiji’s fishing industry has presented significant gender-related challenges. A study examining gender issues in Fiji’s tuna industry, with PafCo as a key employer, highlighted that women could climb the industry’s hierarchy with appropriate training.¹ The research also encompassed Papua New Guinea and Kiribati, revealing shared challenges for women across these nations. As the industry grows, women and children confront heightened strains in adapting to modern life, with public sector responses to health, safety, and domestic abuse concerns often being inadequate. Moreover, the expanding industry inadvertently promotes a spin-off sex-trade. The lure of industrial fish processing in urban areas often leaves villagers, detached from traditional livelihoods, struggling with insufficient wages. However, as the industry and its ancillary businesses grow, opportunities for women may increase. Yet, this expansion may exacerbate social issues already disproportionately affecting women.

In Fiji, land is managed under three distinct systems: Native Land (iTaukei), Crown Land, and Freehold Land. Native or iTaukei land makes up 87 per cent of all land in Fiji. This land is owned by native Fijian (iTaukei) and is primarily administered by the Native Land Trust Board (now known as the iTaukei Land Trust Board) and mataqali (Fijian clan). The Land Sales Law limits ownership of freehold land within city and town council boundaries to Fijian citizens. Therefore, the issue of land ownership must be contextualised within a dual governance system—where land that is customarily owned by indigenous groups can only be legitimately used by Fijian citizens of other ethnicities if permitted by the ethnic Fijian owners.

Traditional structures and cultural norms greatly influence women’s access to resources and their role in community-level resource management. Both women and men, as registered members of a mataqali or clan, hold equal rights to communally owned land, and Fijian law ensures equal inheritance rights for both genders. However, women cannot claim rights to land owned by their husband’s mataqali, and land inheritance traditions often lean towards patriarchal lineages. Men predominantly control access to and decisions concerning traditional fishing grounds (qoliqoli). When families negotiate access to land, fishing grounds, or both private and State lands, women remain reliant on men, since lease or usage agreements typically bear the name of the male household head.¹ Between 2007-2013, various decrees were passed that restricted indigenous rights, especially concerning decision-making over land and assets. The Non-governmental Organisation (NGO), Social Empowerment and Education Programme (SEEP), identified land and leadership as primary issues affecting community governance from 2000 onwards.

Since gaining independence in 1970, Fiji has faced significant political instability, witnessing four military coups between 1987 and 2006. Central to these upheavals are the longstanding tensions between the iTaukei and Indo-Fijians. This military interventionism in politics culminated in the 2006 coup, which significantly marginalised two pivotal institutions: the Methodist Church and the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC). Moreover, the rising militarisation within the public sphere has encumbered Civil Society Organization (CSO) initiatives, especially those concerning women’s rights, peace, and stability.

The 2013 Constitution underscores the military’s role in safeguarding national security, with Section 131 (2) specifically tasking the military with the comprehensive responsibility of ensuring Fiji and its citizens’ security, defence, and well-being. Furthermore, Chapter 10 grants the military expansive and non-retractable immunity concerning their actions during coups. Although government military expenditure escalated from 2016 to 2019, there was a reduction by 2.9 per cent in 2019 relative to 2018, followed by another 8.65 per cent decrease in 2020, leading to military spending representing 1.7 per cent of Fiji’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2021.¹

Of paramount concern is the noted correlation between militarisation and rising incidents of Violence Against Women (VAW), especially during crises. The three coups, including two military and one quasi-military, have entrenched a militaristic ethos, reinforcing patriarchal norms and increasing incidents of brutality by security forces. This amplified militarism has reverberating effects, often diminishing rights previously secured for women and deteriorating the nation’s overall human rights stance. Illustratively, the classification of COVID-19 as a natural disaster under the Natural Disaster Management Act sanctioned increased military involvement, evidenced by armed military personnel overseeing operations at the Fiji National Provident Fund during the pandemic’s initial phase.²

Fijian culture is fundamentally rooted in patriarchal systems, characterised by values, beliefs, and relationships entrenched in social, economic, religious, and political frameworks. These structures consistently define and bolster unequal power dynamics between men and women. This patriarchal influence permeates both private and public realms, where men usually occupy privileged, often dominant positions, while women are often relegated to lesser valued and subordinate roles.¹

Article 26 of the 2013 Constitution guarantees equality and prohibits discrimination on various grounds, including sex, disability, religion and sexual orientation. This guarantee is supported by the 2014 National Gender Policy and the National Development Plan 2017-2036 (NDP). However, there are gaps in integrating constitutional guarantees of equality into laws and policies. Focused group discussions conducted by the Fiji Women’s Forum (FWF) in 2017 revealed that women have limited understanding of essential governmental procedures, like the budgetary cycle, inhibiting their effective participation in the legislative process.

Women’s political participation

This limitation is clear in the sharp decline of women representatives in Fiji’s Parliament, from 10 out of 51 members in 2018 to just five out of 55 (9 per cent) in the 2022 elections.² Despite concerted attempts to expand opportunities for women in politics, Fiji has not achieved its commitment of 33 per cent women’s representation in decision-making bodies at either the national or subnational levels.

The overwhelming dominance of patriarchal practices in decision-making structures further marginalises women. In indigenous settings, leadership roles are largely defined by cultural and religious norms, often favouring those from chiefly families. Due to prevailing societal norms, the public sphere is largely perceived as being for men, while the private domain is designated for women. Notwithstanding, a significant 81 per cent of Fijians believe that women are underrepresented in governance, and 72 per cent assert that heightened female representation would be advantageous. Though more than three-quarters of Fijians claim gender would not influence their voting choice, nearly 40 per cent still hold the belief that men are superior political leaders.³

Women who enter public terrains encounter systemic discrimination, harassment, and violence. Their leadership styles are constantly critiqued, and many lack the networks and resources to contest elections. Adding to the challenge, familial duties and a political landscape largely led by men act as deterrents for potential female leaders.⁴

Gendered Access to Education and Livelihoods

In Fiji, deeply rooted cultural and gender norms often confine women to traditional home roles, influencing their educational and professional choices. While primary education has a commendable 100 per cent net enrolment rate, by the secondary level, girls (91 per cent) outpace boys (79 per cent) in enrolment. However, a concerning 28.2 per cent of upper secondary-aged children are out of school, with teenage pregnancies significantly affecting girls’ continuity in education.⁵

At the tertiary level, women constitute 60-65 per cent of students, predominantly studying in fields like commerce, medicine, education, and law, reflecting gendered expectations. Conversely, more men gravitate towards technical and vocational training. The educational landscape also grapples with issues of bullying, verbal abuse, and alarming instances of sexual violence against girls.⁶

Despite strides in education, post-educational employment remains a challenge for young Fijians, particularly women. The transition from education to work reveals pronounced gendered disparities, underscoring the systemic challenges women face in securing employment, even with academic achievements.⁷

In 2022, only 46 per cent of working-age women participated in the labour force, compared to 75 per cent of their male counterparts.⁸ The dominant reason is traditional gender roles that assign women the responsibility of unpaid care and domestic tasks, with 70 per cent of non-working women attributing their absence from the workforce to housework, versus 5 per cent of men.⁹

The majority of working Fijian women are in informal employment, marked by unstable job security, fluctuating income, and no social protection. This encompasses three quarters of rural women, those in informal settlements, older urban and rural women—including widows and women with disabilities—and those from the LGBTQIA+ community. Entrenched gender norms delineate women’s professional trajectories, resulting in occupational segregation and primarily relegating them to roles mirroring traditional female duties. In urban areas, although there may be a slightly wider scope of opportunities, women predominantly gravitate towards professions such as teaching and nursing, reflecting societal expectations.¹⁰

Women in Fiji earn roughly a third less than their male counterparts. The informal sector sees women working part-time more often than men, and they earn significantly less for comparable tasks. Women predominantly engage in invisible informal work, like home-based tasks or outworker work in Fiji’s garment sector, hindering collective bargaining and heightening exploitation risks. Rural women earn about 75 per cent of what their male counterparts earn, and a 45 per cent urban-rural wage disparity exacerbates poverty risks in rural regions.

Gender-Based Violence

Entrenched patriarchal norms and women’s subordinate position in society increases vulnerabilities to Gender-Based Violence (GBV). According to studies conducted by Fiji Women’s Rights Movement (FWRM), on average, 20 per cent of working Fijian women face workplace sexual harassment. It is particularly rampant in the hospitality sector, with 35 per cent of women affected, but also high in the civil service (30 per cent), health (24 per cent), and retail (23 per cent). Full-time working women experience harassment at a rate of 20 per cent, but it is even higher for part-time (30 per cent) and casual workers (43 per cent). Risks are amplified for younger, single women, especially those working night shifts, on rotational shifts, or changing uniforms at work.¹¹ Domestic violence detrimentally impacts workplace performance, costing an average annual loss of 10 working days.

Deep-rooted gender imbalances contribute to the pervasiveness of violence in various settings, from households to professional environments. Alarmingly, 52 per cent of women face Intimate Partner Violence (IPV)¹² including physical (61 per cent) and emotional violence (58 pe rcent). Moreover, 44 per cent experience severe physical violence, and 15 per cent are assaulted during pregnancy. Notably, 34 per cent of Fijian women have faced marital rape, and 28 per cent have faced economic abuse.¹³

Child sexual abuse is the predominant form of sexual violence in Fiji, comprising 74 per cent of cases between 2015–2018.¹⁴ Of adult women, 16 per cent reported sexual abuse before age 15.¹⁵ According to FWRM’s study of sexual violence cases decided by the High Court, between 2017–2020, 94 per cent of rape victims were females, with 68 per cent of the cases involving minors.¹⁶

To combat GBV, laws like the Crimes Act 2009, the Domestic Violence Act 2009, and the Family Law Amendment Act 2012 have been enacted. The Domestic Violence Act 2009 enables GBV victim-survivors to obtain restraining orders, and the Family Law Amendment Act 2012 acknowledges de facto relationships. Fiji’s ‘No Drop’ policy, provided in the criminal laws, ensure that all GBV complaints are investigated, even if later withdrawn.

Still, the gap between law and its application is significant. The Domestic Violence Act’s gender-neutral phrasing fails to capture the unique gender dynamics of domestic violence. Many women, especially in remote areas of Fiji, remain uninformed about their legal rights. Studies have shown that women usually wait approximately 2.5 years before reporting abuse due to its societal normalisation, fear of repercussions, or mistrust in the police.¹⁷ Unfortunately, police frequently perceive VAW as a private family matter, downplaying the severity of the issue. Their efforts are further hampered by insufficient funding, which restricts their reach between remote communities and urban centres. Additionally, women encounter challenges when seeking restraining orders.

The 2013 Constitution guarantees rights to freedom of expression and association, but also permits the government to limit these rights for a wide variety of reasons, including maintaining national security, public order, safety, and morality. The Public Order Act empowers the government to enforce public order using force or to detain individuals on grounds of ‘endangering public safety’ or ‘preserving the peace’. Similar laws in other countries have been exploited to target trans people, sex workers, and others. There have been notable instances where the government responded strongly to public dissent regarding its policies and proposals, leading to the detention of opposition leaders and youth workers. Due to legal constraints and oversight by the Media Industry Development Authority, independent media often resort to self-censorship on politically sensitive or communal issues.¹ Furthermore, public access to information remains restricted.

Fiji, a small island state, is acutely exposed to the ravages of climate change and weather-related disasters such as intense tropical cyclones, storms, sea level rise, ocean warming and acidification, along with related hazards like floods, landslides, and droughts. These adversities lead to immediate human impacts, recovery costs, and repercussions across health, livelihood sectors (notably agriculture, forestry, fisheries, transport, and tourism), housing, infrastructure, poverty, and social cohesion. Furthermore, many traditional villages and rural communities, which centre their daily economic and social activities around the coastline, face the imminent threat of rising sea levels, escalating temperatures, coastal degradation, and increased cyclonic activities. Consequently, numerous Fijian communities have undergone relocation due to climate-induced displacement.

However, climate change impacts are not uniformly distributed. Deep-rooted gender inequalities and power imbalances mean women bear a disproportionate brunt, hindering their ability to rebound post-disasters. Challenges faced by women are also differentiated by intersectional identities, influenced by factors such as age, disability, cultural background, economic status, sexual orientation, gender identity, and location. Especially vulnerable are women in remote and rural communities, often due to restricted access to resources and vital information.¹ With displacement, their challenges multiply as they grapple with longer distances to secure food and water, while simultaneously catering to familial needs. Such responsibilities, coupled with heightened poverty levels and resource scarcities from asset and income losses, not only restrict their choices and opportunities but also jeopardise their safety, health, and security.² Women’s limited access to insurance and finance also lead to heightened vulnerabilities during climate / weather related disasters. This intricate web of vulnerabilities impedes their recovery, undermining sustainable development goals and hindering the advancement of women’s human rights in Fiji.³

Disasters impact both genders, but women face disproportionate losses.⁴ While men’s losses are often of higher absolute value, women’s losses make up a significant portion of their livelihood assets. Essential sources of income, such as crops and small livestock, which sustain families, are devastated. Additionally, damaged fisheries habitats, crucial for many women, take years to recover. Women, predominantly in the informal sector, often lack social insurance. A telling statistic reveals that 88 per cent of Fijian market vendors are women; post-Tropical Cyclone (TC) Winston in 2016, many lost everything. Within six months, there was a 300 per cent hike in wholesale prices and persistent produce shortages. Coastal Fijian women, who rely on fishing and handcrafts, are severely affected by habitat destruction, which undermines their income sources and exacerbates food insecurity.

Disasters and climate change intensify existing levels of Gender-Based Violence (GBV), while pre-existing GBV makes women and children more vulnerable to these calamities. After TC Winston, domestic violence helpline calls surged, while the 2012 Western Division floods saw rises in rape and incest reports. Women also frequently experienced escalated sexual harassment during and post-cyclones. The hardships, like food shortages linked with these events, can heighten GBV risks. For instance, inability to prepare meals due to water scarcity can spark domestic tensions. Prolonged stays in cramped, temporary shelters with little privacy amplify risks of various forms of violence against women and girls. Financial stresses can lead to desperate measures: post the 2012 floods, some women resorted to sex-for-food trades, while economic strains push families to marry off young girls prematurely.

Fiji has ratified the Paris Agreement and initiated the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Gender Action Plan. Nationally, various frameworks, policies, and plans acknowledge gender roles in environmental challenges, positioning women as agents of change. For instance, the National Climate Change Policy and the 2021 Climate Change Act recognise the pivotal role of women. However, certain laws like the Environment Management Act and the proposed National Disaster Risk Management Bill overlook gender dimensions.

On the institutional side, there is a dissonance between entities working on climate adaptation and those on gender equality. While professionals acknowledge gender issues, they often lack comprehensive knowledge to fully integrate a gender-responsive approach. Additionally, at subnational levels, there is inconsistency in applying the national government’s climate adaptation approach. A significant data gap exists concerning women’s vulnerability, and there is a lack of harmonisation in indicators used by different agencies.

For Fiji to combat climate change while upholding women’s rights, it is imperative to intertwine gender perspectives in policies, integrate women in decision-making, and ensure policies at all levels are harmonised with a gender-focused lens.